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Recent Developments

Farris v. State

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a
failure to report for weekend
detention at the Allegany County
Detention Center did not rise to the
crime of "escape" as defined in
section 139 of article 27 of the
Maryland Annotated Code. Farris
v. State, 351 Md. 24, 716 A.2d 237
(1998). In so doing, the court
concluded that because the
defendant's freedom was not
subject to any restrictions, he was
not custody at the time of his
failure to appear.
The court
reasoned that it would not be
within its purview to expand the
statute when its meaning was clear
and unambiguous.
Floyd Dale Farris ("Farris")
was convicted on November 2,
1995, in the District Court of
Maryland for Allegany County of
possession of a controlled
dangerous substance. As a result
of the conviction, Farris was
sentenced
to
ninety
days
incarceration, with all the time
suspended, and two years of
supervised probation.
In a
subsequent court appearance,
Farris was found guilty of
violating his probation agreement.
The district court again sentenced
Farris to ninety days incarceration,
with all but thirty days suspended,
and placed him on three years
supervised probation.
As a
condition of his sentence, Farris
agreed to participate in the
Allegany
County
Sheriff s
Department weekend service of
sentence program. Farris agreed
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that his thirty-day sentence would
be served over fifteen consecutive
weekends commencing at 11 a.m.
on Friday morning and ending at
11 a.m. on Sunday morning.
During the week, Farris was not
subject to the restrictions of the
weekend service program and was
accordingly not credited with any
time served. The district court
instructed Farris that failure to
comply with the conditions of his
weekend detention would result in
his incarceration for the entire
ninety-day sentence.
Farris began serving his
weekend detention on May 3,
1996. On June 21, 1996, Farris
failed to appear for his weekend
detention and, as a matter of
course, was charged with escape.
Following a trial in the Circuit
Court of Maryland for Allegany
County, Farris was convicted of
escaping lawful detention and
confinement, and was sentenced to

a consecutive six-month sentence
of incarceration.
Farris appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland
where his conviction for escape
was affirmed.
The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari in order to resolve the
issue of whether the failure of a
person to report for weekend
detention in Allegany County
constituted an "escape" as defined
by Maryland law.
In its review of the case, the
court of appeals focused on
whether Farris was within the
constructive custody of the
detention center during the week.
Farris, 351 Md. at 26, 716 A.2d at
239. The court did not address
whether he escaped because the
resolution of the custody question
dictated the answer to the escape
question. Id. at 28, 716 A.2d at
240.
In the first part of its opinion,
the court reviewed and reiterated
the method by which it interpreted
statutes. Id. at 28-29, 716 A.2d at
240. The court reaffirmed the line
of cases outlining rules of statutory
construction: if the statute is clear
on its face, then no other
interpretation will be used to
supplant the legislative intent
behind the statute, Id. at 28, 716
A.2d at 240 (citing Briggs v. State,
348 Md. 470, 477, 704 A.2d 904,
908 (1998)); if the statute is
ambiguous, the court would then
turn to "the usual meaning of the
words" within its context and the
legislative intent behind the
29.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 43
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statute, Id. at 28-29, 716 A.2d at
240 (citing Briggs, 348 Md. at
477, 704 A.2d at 908); and if the
statute is a criminal statute, then it
is to "be construed in favor of the
defendant to prevent courts from
extending punishment to cases not
plainly within the language of the
statute." Id. at 29, 716 A.2d 240
(citing Tapscott v. State, 343 Md.
650, 654, 684 A.2d 439, 441
(1996)).
With those guiding principles
in mind, the court examined the
applicable portion of section
139(a) of article 27 defining the
elements of escape. ld. The first
element of "escape" required the
prisoner to have been in lawful
custody. ld. The statute provides,
in pertinent part, that a prisoner
must have been detained in "the
state penitentiary or a jail, house of
correction, reformatory, station
house, or other place of
confinement in this state or . . . to
the Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Administration for examination or
impatient treatment." ld. The
court noted that the custody could
be either "actual" (escaping from a
prison cell) or "constructive" (not
returning from a weekend
furlough). Id. (citing 4 Charles E.
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §
633 (1996)). However, the court
did not have to differentiate
between the two, because both
forms satisfied the definition of
custody under section 139(a). Id.
at 30, 716 A.2d at 241. To have
lawful custody, either "actual" or
"constructive,"
the
court
determined that the person must
have some limitation imposed on
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 44

his personal freedom by legal
authority. Id. at 33, 716 A.2d at
242. The court stated that "[w]hen
a person is free in every sense of
the term, he or she is no longer in
custody, and hence, cannot be
guilty of the crime of escape." Id.
The second element of
"escape" is that the prisoner must
actually depart from lawful
detention or custody. Id. at 30,
716 A.2d 240-41 (citing Fabian v.
State,3 Md. App. 270, 281, 239
A.2d. 100, 108 (1968)). Because
the statute did not define the term
"escape," the court relied upon the
plain language definition as well as
the line of Maryland cases defining
"escape." Id. at 29, 716 A.2d 240.
The court, however, did not have
to provide extensive judicial gloss
on the definition of "escape"
because the court concluded that
Farris was not in custody, "actual"
or "constructive," at the time of his
failure to appear. /d. at 35, 716
A.2d at 243.
The court of appeals rejected
the State's contention that it had
constructive custody over Farris
during the week. ld. at 34, 716
A.2d at 242. The court aptly noted
that Farris was free during the
week and that he was "neither
lawfully committed to the
detention center nor subject to any
[of its] restrictions." Id. In a
footnote, the court stated that if it
had accepted the State's argument
that they had constructive custody
over Farris during the week,
Farris' thirty-one day sentence
would have actually been one
hundred and three days. ld. at 35,
716 A.2d at 243 & n.5.

The court went on to state that
Allegany County was one of the
only counties that had not
criminalized failure to appear for
weekend detention, and that the
Maryland legislature knew of this
anomaly. ld. at 35, 716 A.2d at
243.
The legislature had
criminalized failure to appear in
other counties and "certainly knew
how to do it" for Allegany County.
ld. (citing statutes for ten
Maryland
Counties
that
criminalized either the failure to
comply with authorization of
leave, the failure to return to
custody, or the violation of a term
of leave). The court concluded
that Farris was not in custody at
the time of his violation and that
he did not depart from the place of
his detention. ld. His failure to
appear for weekend detention at
the Allegany County Detention
Center did not constitute the crime
of escape in Allegany County as
provided for in section 139 of
article 27 of the Maryland
Annotated Code. ld.
Finding that the failure to
appear for weekend detention did
not constitute the crime of
"escape" in Allegany County, the
court of appeals wanted to make
the legislature aware that it needed
to re-examine the criminality of
this failure to appear as applied to
Maryland counties. It is the job of
the legislature, not the courts, to
bring into conformity the laws of
the counties. A better-unified
statute criminalizing the failure to
appear for weekend detention
would end the disparity between
the counties and be a source of
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consistency upon which Maryland
practitioners can depend.
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